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Abstract 
 
Political leaders matter again. The study of political leaders, particularly prime 
ministers has been an under-researched area, yet the leadership discourse is 
back on the agenda. This article puts prime ministerial predominance into this 
context using comparative analysis to examine prime ministerial leadership in 
Australia and the UK and evidence from the tenures of Tony Blair and John 
Howard. The article contends that similar centralising tendencies, personal 
projection, and autonomy from established structures were evident in the tenures 
of these two prime ministers. Ultimately this created dislocation (of varying 
degrees) between the leaders, followers and the wider electorate. 
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 Blair and Howard: Predominant prime ministers compared1 
 
The art of leadership is saying no not yes. It is very easy to say yes. 
(Tony Blair, Mail on Sunday 2 October 2004) 
 
"This country does not need 'new leadership', it does not need 'old leadership', it 
needs the right leadership'." (John Howard, 14 October 2007 Canberra, 
announcing 2007 Federal Election) 
 
John Uhr, in his illuminating analysis of the role of ethics in Australian 
government Terms of Trust pointed out, ‘Prime Ministers Blair and Howard come 
from opposite sides of the partisan fence, but they share this longing for pre-
eminence’.2 Tony Blair and John Howard shared the same period of time in 
office, and maintained dominant leadership stances: ascendant individuals, who 
centralised and accumulated power resources to symbolise the governments 
they led.  
 
Ten years is a reasonable length of time to assess the impact and leadership 
style of the two men. Blair just made it to his ten year anniversary before 
choosing to step down after constant pressure from his Chancellor, while Howard 
fought and lost a fifth election in November 2007 (at the age of 68), after 11 
years in power.  Howard and Blair both grappled with the leadership succession 
issue. Howard entered the election in 2007 with a commitment not to fight 
another one and step down during the term of office in favour of his Treasurer. In 
the event it did not matter as he was defeated by a resurgent Australian Labor 
party (ALP), and also faced the ignominy of losing his parliamentary seat.  
 
The idea that leaders matter is not new. Thatcher, Reagan, Hawke and Fraser 
were all dominant and perceptively strong leaders. Political leadership, in the 
case of these two prime ministers, is not just a function of government. Strong 
leadership as exemplified by Blair and Howard goes beyond structure. Both men 
developed autonomous relationships with the executive, the party and the 
electorate. There is evidence that voters vote less for parties and more for 
leaders as cleavage politics has broken down3. The Australian political 
psychologist Graham Little gave weight to the notion of the autonomous leader: 
 
 ‘The strong leader should look as if he comes from outside structure, that 
 he is more alive, brave and purposeful than his social learning and role 
 performance could have made him. His assertiveness should appear 
 comfortable and important to him, a vital underpinning of his commitment 
 to order4. 
 
Blair and Howard can both be seen in this light; though plainly different in style 
and personality, their premierships were autonomous and personalised. Strong 
leaders are inclined to dominate using tough moralistic rhetoric, hostility towards 
enemies, refusing to compromise and insisting on decisive action, anything else 
is a sign of weakness.5 Blair took on oppositional forces throughout his 
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 leadership - often those within his own party (for example, rewriting of Clause IV 
of the Labour party constitution) - with relish. His refrain was constantly that his 
action was the right thing to do6. Howard took to task the liberal intelligentsia in a 
culture war on political correctness in Australia, and employed an 
uncompromising stance towards asylum seekers. Using Blair and Howard as 
case studies, their leadership can be put into context, combining the impact of 
individual leadership style and structural change. Strangio and Walter 
conceptualise Howard’s dominance as the ‘unhappy convergence of the 
systemic and the singular’.7 Blair, backed with the authority of a large electoral 
mandate, had replaced a discredited and tired government. His stock was high 
and his personal political capital strong. He had to establish the institutional 
capacity to support him, but was well placed to do so. Howard had to establish 
his political authority (he removed several departmental heads early and over 
time shaped the bureaucracy to his leadership). He did so with successive 
electoral victories, but had at his disposal a powerful executive (a Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet and a well established private office available to him).  
 
This article makes four comparative arguments on contemporary political 
leadership. First, there is a strong case for considering political leadership in 
systemic and individual terms. Second, character, style and personality are 
important variables in assessing leadership. Third, the prime minister as party 
leader is both empowered and constrained. Fourth, the contemporary prime 
minister in these two countries acts increasingly as an autonomous agent. In 
conclusion: 
 
- Blair and Howard both demonstrated ‘strong leadership’, encompassing a 
tough, moralistic, uncompromising stance. 
- Both leaders became autonomous agents, reaching beyond the executive, 
and party to engage directly with the electorate. 
- Personality, control, and public projection combine to establish leaders as 
predominant forces in the extra-executive environment. 
- Though agency (and the power to influence) is important, prime ministerial 
power is still contingent on location, relation, environment and events.  
 
1. Political Leadership 
 
Leaders as prime ministers not only have an impact on individuals and the 
institutions that govern them, but also on wider aspects of social life and even 
beyond domestic borders. Jim Walter draws attention to the tension between the 
liberal and democratic strands in liberal democracy, in that leadership does not fit 
into either the liberal perspective of individual rights and freedoms or the 
democratic perspective of collective decision-making.8 The issue is dealt with by 
attempting to constrain leadership in liberal democracies; checks and balances 
attempt to limit powerful individuals. Yet powerful individuals can shape and 
stretch existing institutions and loosen the shackles.9 Much that makes these 
individuals powerful comes from beyond the formal institutional or executive 
arena. It may be strength and type of personality, use of communication tools 
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 and image projection. It may be dominance of (and beyond) the traditional 
political party. 
 
In contrast to the burgeoning study of leadership in other disciplines, political 
science has been slow to make systemic analyses of political leadership10. The 
keenness of scholars to concentrate on institutions and structures has led to a 
downplaying of the role of leadership. Prime ministers in particular are viewed as 
constrained actors; dependent and contingent11. Comparative angles have often 
been lacking in a sub-field generally dominated by American work 
(understandably given the presidential system). Ludger Helms emphasised this 
point. 
 
 Sophisticated studies on prime ministerial leadership styles, in particular 
 those trying explicitly to develop an internationally comparative 
 perspective, have remained rather thin on the ground.12 
 
Scholarly work on prime ministers has tended to be dominated by 
institutionalists, understanding and explaining the role of the prime minister in the 
core executive. This approach, seeing the role of the British prime minister 
through a collective prism as one actor among many, has dominated the 
literature. The absence of a developed body of scholarly work on the prime 
minister and a systemic framework for studying the position may be a hangover 
from the British political preoccupation with the perceived demise of cabinet 
government. 
 
The Australian prime minister has similarly suffered from a lack of systemic 
scholarly study. As one would expect in a country that inherited parliamentary 
democracy from Britain in the 1850s, the debate has been framed with reference 
to the British cabinet government argument. Pat Weller views this debate as 
‘unsatisfactory’, presenting unrealistic and polarised concepts of political power. 
The gap has been filled somewhat in Britain in the Blair years, but in Australia 
detailed study of the ‘forms, institutions and conventions through and by which 
political power is exercised at the centre of government is lacking’.13 
 
The interactionist approach to studying leadership helps, ‘characterised by the 
attempt to account for personal and systemic variables that have an impact on 
overall leadership’: 
  
 From this perspective, political leaders operate within an environment that 
 constrains their freedom of action and shapes their ambitions and 
 behaviour. However leaders are not considered to be hostages of the 
 system. Rather they are seen as being able to influence their environment 
 and leave their specific mark on the system.14 
 
Similarly Robert Elgie points out that ‘the extent to which political leaders are 
able to influence the decision-making process is considered to be contingent 
upon the interaction between the leader and the leadership environment in which 
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 the leader operates.’15 This is a theme echoed by Bell, Hargrove and 
Theakston’s ‘skill in context’ model which enables scholars to ‘assess the relative 
importance of personal political skill in policy achievement in relation to 
contextual factors’. The theoretical premise is that ‘it is possible to compare 
political leaders within and across institutions to ask about the conditions under 
which individuality makes a difference’.16 
 
This approach blends the institutional or systemic with the personal as a means 
to understand and explain political leadership. Since power is derived from both 
of these aspects it is the combination of the two that shapes the level of 
predominance. 
 
 Predominance grants the prime minister the ‘potential’ for leadership 
 within the government, but only when personal power resources are 
 married with institutional power resources, and when the prime minister is 
 able to use both wisely and well.17 
 
Within this context we can describe both Blair and Howard as ‘predominant’ 
prime ministers who lent themselves well to comparative analysis. Both 
personalised and dominated as leaders and predominance gives us a framework 
within which to analyse. 
 
Predominance derives from this judicious use of personal and institutional power. 
Richard Heffernan identifies the following personal power resources : reputation, 
skill and ability; association with actual or anticipated political success; public 
popularity; and high standing in his or her party. Institutional power resources 
identified by Heffernan include the following: being the legal head of the 
government; agenda setting through leadership of the cabinet and cabinet 
committee system and Whitehall; strengthening Downing Street and the Cabinet 
Office (the centre); agenda setting through news media management. 
 
The combination and use of power resources is therefore essential to 
understanding contemporary prime ministerial predominance. It locates the 
research within acknowledged core executive studies and draws on newer 
concepts of presidentialisation.18 This provides a framework for understanding 
what predominance is, and how to recognise it.19 Heffernan developed his 
framework based on the British premier, but his work also provides a 
comparative basis for understanding prime ministerial predominance in similar 
countries.  
 
2. Character, Style and Personality 
 
Political leaders use and stretch the power resources available and individual 
character, style and personality are factors. James Barber’s study of US 
Presidents argued that personality shaped presidential performance, whereby  
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  … the degree and quality of a President’s emotional involvement are 
 powerful influences on how he defines the issue itself, how much 
 attention he pays to it, which facts and persons he sees as relevant 
 to its resolution, and finally, what principles and purposes he associates 
 with the issue.20 
 
Character relates to the moral or mental qualities and attributes that define an 
individual, but as Barber points out it comes from the Greek word to stamp, 
impress or engrave. So how much does the character of the leader come to the 
fore to affect, shape and influence political leadership? 
 
Character is not an easy concept to pin down; it can be highly subjective. The 
following exchange from ABCs Four Corners programme (19 February 1996) on 
the eve of John Howard’s election as prime minister is instructive. 
 
 Q. How would you describe yourself? 
 A. As a person somebody very much with quintessential Australian values. 
 I'm direct, I'm unpretentious and I'm pretty dogged and I hope I've got a 
 capacity to laugh at myself and not take myself too seriously. 
 Q. So if you chose three words, they'd be? 
 A. I hope... I'd like to be seen as an average Australian bloke. I can't think 
 of... I can't think of a nobler description of anybody than to be called an 
 average Australian bloke. 
 Q. Is an average Australian bloke the sort of bloke who's going to be prime 
 minister of Australia? 
 A. But people can have other qualities than just being described as an 
 average Australian bloke. I think you've got to have a combination of 
 identifying somebody, but also respecting in them certain values. 
 Q. What do you see as your leadership qualities? 
 A. I think I'm seen as trustworthy. I’m seen as having determination and 
 persistence and I'm seen as having a capacity to reach achievable 
 answers to difficult issues. 
 
This exchange, viewed in the context of an election campaign, shows the 
difficulty in separating true character from image and again from political values. 
Here Howard set out his stall as appealing to the broad Australian voter, as one 
of them.  Does this view of himself truly reflect his character and have an impact 
on his leadership? In eleven years we can see how his identification as an 
ordinary, trustworthy Australian became an integral part of his premiership. He 
was regarded by some commentators as a pragmatist who was legitimised by his 
identification with the public will, as a leader who symbolised an ‘Australian way 
of life’.21 
 
Howard was widely recognised as a practitioner, uninterested in broad 
abstractions or questions of system and process. He sought to redefine 
Australian values to align the public with his own view of the Australian core. This 
needs to be understood in the context of the Keating premiership whereby 
Australia’s history and place in the world was the subject of much angst and 
debate. Howard as the constitutional monarchist has been the embodiment of 
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 conservative values to some, and indeed this (albeit narrow) view influenced the 
more traditional aspects of his premiership. In the run up to the 2001 federal 
election, he took a hard line on asylum-seekers attempting to gain entry to 
Australia stating Australia’s ‘undoubted right to decide who comes here and in 
what circumstances’. Howard’s philosophy also had a major bearing on his 
leadership. ‘Howard is steeped not just in Australian Liberal rhetoric, but in the 
experiences he speaks of: families and small businesses, centred on work and 
neighbourhood, bounded by a relatively taken-for-granted nationalism’.22 Howard 
grew up in a Sydney suburb, went to a state school and then studied law at 
Sydney University. He practised as a solicitor for several years before entering 
federal parliament in 1974 at the age of thirty-five.23 Class, background, and 
experience though may not be such obvious markers of leadership as once they 
were. Adams describes Howard as ‘an enigma’ and identifies eight different 
competing and complementary views of the man in office. Howard can be viewed 
as the ruthless politician, the tough hard-hearted conservative, the suburban 
solicitor, the ‘believer’, the leader governing for all of Australia as Menzies 
successor, the ally of America, the man in the polls, and as presidential.24 
Australian journalist Denis Shanahan narrows it down to two Howards. One is a 
caricature, routinely lambasted and derided by commentators as a divisive, poll-
driven, out of touch, conservative. The other is a more complex and successful 
Howard in tune with and responding to the Australian people. Similarly Howard’s 
biographers Wayne Errington and Peter Van Onselen talked of ‘many Howards’, 
Howard was, accordingly, widely underestimated and misunderstood. Such a 
multiplicity of analysis perhaps demonstrates that modern political leaders are 
much written about, but little systemic analysis is actually produced. In general 
there is too much focuson the individual and not enough ‘thinking beyond and 
around’ or putting the ‘skill in context’. 
 
Similarly, Blair proved difficult to pigeonhole. He has been described as both 
everything and nothing. Skidelsky likens him to Keynes’ description of Lloyd 
George as ‘…rooted in nothing; he is void and without content; he is an 
instrument and a player at the same time’.25 Often regarded as a chameleon 
politician, much of the New Labour project rested on Blair’s broad personal 
appeal and importantly his lack of Labour party baggage. In contrast to Howard, 
biographical study of Blair is rich and historical journalists have shown a certain 
fascination with his leadership. Seldon identifies what he calls Blair’s ten defining 
character traits which again demonstrate, as with Howard, the difficulty in nailing 
the character of the individual. These are in fact more defining characteristics of 
Blair’s premiership than personal traits. Two of these relate to the context within 
which Blair led – the cumulative influence of events; and luck. Three refer to 
Blair’s style of leadership: the influence of key individuals; a lack of considered 
policy-making; decision-making among a tight-knit, informal group. The 
remaining five refer more specifically to his personal character: his understanding 
of British political history; as barrister-actor; as conciliator; his energy and 
physical stamina; and his religious conviction.26 Blair was also an enigma. Like 
Howard he had a legal background, as a barrister, but his education at a fee-
paying Edinburgh school and Oxford, represented a more traditional (though not 
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 necessarily Labour) route to the top. Attention is often drawn to the moral and 
religious conviction that has underpinned Blair’s life. It came to the fore most 
notably in Blair’s second term of office, one dominated by foreign policy issues. 
‘He conceptualises the world as a struggle between good and evil in which his 
particular vocation is to advance the former’ says Seldon, who suggested this 
conviction has led to a greater decisiveness on the international stage than 
domestically27.  
 
Some political leaders may ‘steer a course towards ‘high’ politics (defence, 
foreign policy, constitutional reform) and away from ‘low’ politics’ (domestic 
affairs – education, health, law and order). Writing before Blair’s period of office 
Elgie noted: 
 
  ‘These areas reinforce the statecraft aspect of the leader’s role. They 
 emphasise the difference between the status of Presidents and Prime 
 ministers and that of other members of the government. They also usually 
 provide good photo opportunities and a chance to escape the low-life 
 intrigue of party politics’.28 
 
Blair though has been most often characterised as the ‘barrister-actor’. His legal 
training and, albeit limited, acting career (as a student), combined to make him a 
powerful persuader and an impressive public speaker. Presentation and single-
minded belief have been hallmarks of his public persona, (though he will be the 
first to state that leadership is about demonstrating strength of resolve and 
character). Displays of humility were rare, as for Blair any demonstrations of 
weakness were signs of poor leadership.29 
 
Blair needs to be understood within the context of his ascent to the top. Eighteen 
years out of office had convinced the architects of New Labour that Labour that 
once elected the party needed to embrace the centre ground, occupy it and then 
not withdraw from it, convinced that governments ruling from the left could never 
be re-elected. Blair, a product of a soundly middle class upbringing and not 
wedded to party factions had the appeal and public profile to succeed. So the 
seeds of an essentially ideology-free party were sown with this pursuit of lasting 
electoral success, with the unencumbered Blair at the helm. Blair’s leadership 
was essential for the New Labour project, according to the architects Mandelson 
and Little, and his personality in creating an unapologetically strong centre was 
crucial. 
 
 ‘Like Mrs Thatcher, Tony Blair has a clear idea of what he wants, he is 
 impatient when others do not have the courage or imagination to go along 
 with him, and he does not let up once he has resolved on a way 
 forward’.30   
 
Circumstance and events combined to propel both Blair and Howard to the top 
position. Character traits are then clearly reflected in the style of governing, the 
legal approach, the moral strand, the oratory. Religious conviction linked the two 
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 leaders, though image and politics separated them. Yet these are nothing without 
supporting structures and supporters willing to put faith in the leader. 
 
Leadership styles vary across time and space. In Australia, Encel’s early 
characterisation of prime ministers as either ‘larrikins’ or ‘prima donnas’ 
demonstrates a less complicated description of leadership patterns. Maddox 
provided a more sophisticated typology dividing Australian prime ministers into 
initiators, protectors and maintainers, with the last category he suggested as the 
most successful.31 Howard, in the tradition of most Liberal leaders would be a 
maintainer, preserving stability. His style tended towards the managerial, 
uninspiring in speeches, but focused and efficient in running his cabinet. Avoiding 
the long-term vision and rhetoric of the initiator, his style was less dynamic and 
more conservative. He fashioned an image of extreme ordinariness, his rhetoric 
was always sober and measured. He looked and often acted like a bank 
manager. Yet his decade in power was marked by considerable political rupture. 
He took on the unions, displayed indifference to Australia’s troubled indigenous 
people, escaped responsibility for the ‘children overboard affair’, followed the US 
into Iraq, and endured the Australian Wheat Board bribery scandal. Although he 
managed to connect with a large section of the electorate (the so called ‘Howard 
battlers’) he polarised opinion and created an angry group of critics from across 
the political spectrum.  
 
Blair by contrast preferred the informal, was impatient with bureaucratic 
transparency and accountability and uninterested in collegial government. He 
traded on dynamic rhetoric, constantly initiating, and persuading through oratory. 
If Howard was old and more ordinary, Blair was young and visionary. Blair had 
his critics who became, post-Iraq, more personal and vitriolic, but he did not 
create the political divide more evident under Howard. Both followed the US into 
Iraq, but while Blair was morally convinced of the case, Howard (always more 
cautious) did not commit significant troop numbers. However both leaders 
developed strong political centres to provide institutional capacity and maximise 
the use of powerful executives in bending the legislature and cabinet colleagues 
to accept an individualised policy agenda. 
 
 
3. Prime Minister as Party Leader 
 
The issue of how parties select their leaders is important, but so too is 
understanding the priorities and perceptions of the electorate and the ties of 
patronage, ideology and friendship. Blair’s emergence and election as party 
leader and then prime minister is well documented.32 Only 20 days passed 
between the death of Labour leader John Smith and the announcement that 
Blair’s long time political friend Gordon Brown would not stand in the leadership 
election. This left the way clear for Blair to assume the leadership. Many 
accounts of this pivotal moment in Labour party politics exist, covering what may 
or not may have been agreed in the frenetic meetings between the two men.33 
Blair had built up such a lead in the polls (particularly as the candidate most likely 
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 to win the next election) and was so far ahead of the other candidates, Prescott 
and Beckett, as to make his election a formality. In the electoral college vote, 
Blair secured 57 percent of the total vote, 60.5 percent of MPs and MEPs, 58.2 
percent of party members and 52.3 per cent of trade unionists. Blair had gained a 
significant majority in all sections, even the trade union college where he had the 
support of only two leaders of the Labour-affiliated trade unions.34 
 
Blair was only 41 when he assumed the party leadership and had entered 
parliament only 11 years earlier. The way he emerged as leader was instructive. 
Together with Brown, he had been planning reform of the party for some time; he 
displayed a level of opportunism, and quickly reached out beyond the 
constituency that elected him, to establish his credentials.35 As Tom Quinn notes, 
‘those intra-party actors entitled to participate generally choose leaders they 
believe will benefit them, whether that means improving the party’s election 
prospects or adopting a given policy platform’.36 The context was of course 
successive electoral defeats and a weak, divided opposition. 
 
Leadership of the Labour party confers a great level of power, patronage, and 
control of the party and of policy in government. Until 1981 the leader was 
elected in a secret ballot by fellow MPs but the electoral college system, 
designed to build greater links between the leader and the party, established a 
wider franchise and accountability. However the 1993 reforms, which included 
the rise in nomination threshold to 20 per cent and the end of the union block 
vote, made the costs of entry for potential leadership challengers high. Mindful of 
the damaging effects of leadership contests (for leader and deputy) in Labour’s 
recent past, the incumbent’s position was made secure. The legitimacy of being 
elected by single members also gave Blair an authority and connection that 
transcended the traditional trade union support. 
 
John Howard’s passage to the top could not have been more different or indeed 
more tortuous, but in a similar way it shaped his experience as prime minister. 
Judith Brett calls the power of the leader of the parliamentary party the third 
organising principle in the Liberal party (the first two being control of the 
parliamentary party over the formation of party policy and a strong federal 
structure). The parliamentary party has sole control over the election of the 
leader. In the aftermath of the Menzies era the Liberal party discarded four 
leaders between 1966 and 1975. Stability came with Malcolm Fraser’s tenure, 
but following his resignation in 1983 the party then had five different leaders 
before John Howard’s second stint in 1995. The Liberal party has always been a 
leadership party which depends on a leader. The story of the Liberal party 
demonstrates the importance of ‘strong leadership’ to the party’s fortunes 
 
 The Liberal Party has been politically successful when it has had an 
 electorally successful leader, who has been able to give cohesion and 
 direction to the party. [.] The party’s periods of difficulty have been 
 marked by destructive conflicts over leadership.37 
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 Howard led the party for a brief period during the turbulent 1980s, but lost the 
1987 election. His standing in the polls was so low he was dubbed ‘Mr 18 per 
cent’ and after losing two leadership election contests he himself memorably 
declared that a return to lead the Liberal party would be akin to ‘Lazarus with 
triple bypass.’ The Liberal party was deeply divided. Howard, representing the 
‘wets’ had blundered as leader (on Asian immigration in 1988) and engaged in an 
ongoing battle with rival Andrew Peacock. So the party appeared desperate 
when it turned to him yet again in January 1995 following Peacock and his 
successor John Hewson’s failure and Alexander Downer’s disastrous stint. In 
contrast to the formalised manner in which the British Labour party now selects 
its leaders, with a wide and clearly defined constituency, the Liberal party of 
Australia concentrates the franchise in the federal parliamentary party, termed 
the caucus. Liberal party rules are not specific on the election of leaders; the only 
reference in its constitution to the how the leader is selected is as follows: 
 
 52. The Parliamentary Party shall:-  
 (a) appoint its Leader, who shall thereupon become the Parliamentary 
 Leader of the Organisation;  
 
Voting and nomination procedures are not apparent or publicly available. The 
process is fluid and candidates emerge from the group, testing support before 
putting themselves forward to challenge incumbents or fill a vacancy. The 
Australian Labor party also selects its leaders from the parliamentary caucus, but 
its leader is bound by party policy and has much less autonomy. It is noticeable 
that while the election of party leaders has been widened to incorporate the party 
membership of all three main parties in Britain, Australia still concentrates its 
leadership selection within the parliamentary parties. 
 
After the period of Liberal party strife it seemed the party had nowhere else to 
turn but to Howard as ‘the last man standing’. Howard was elected unopposed in 
1995, with Peter Costello elected unopposed as his deputy. He had the 
opportunity to learn from his previous tenure as party leader, and from the 
mistakes made not only by himself but also by the other leaders. His ascent 
could not have been more markedly different from Blair’s: experience against 
youth (Howard was 57 in 1996, Blair 44). Most leaders come to office having had 
a taste of government: Blair of course had no ministerial experience; Howard on 
the other hand had been a junior minister and then Treasurer from 1977 until 
1983, in Malcolm Fraser’s government. Errington and Van Onselen cite Howard’s 
wilderness years in opposition as shaping the pragmatism, tenacity and political 
ruthlessness he demonstrated as prime minister.38 
 
The route to leadership of the party may demonstrate Howard’s persistence and 
Blair’s opportunism, but they would have proved to be mere historical footnotes 
without the ensuing parliamentary electoral victories. These cemented intra and 
extra executive authority in the individual leader as a party asset. Indeed with the 
value of hindsight we can now see how crucial the electoral victories in 1996 in 
1997 established Howard and Blair’s leadership credentials and defined their 
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 premierships. Howard achieved a big swing in 1996 against the unpopular 
Keating government to establish a solid parliamentary majority in the House of 
Representatives. His first term was a troubled one, but despite running a 
campaign based on the introduction of a goods and services tax (the GST - a 
broad-based value-added tax), and losing the two party-preferred vote to Labor, 
the Liberal-National Coalition held on in 199839. The 2001 election was 
dominated by security (Howard was in the US on 11 September) and asylum (the 
government refused permission for the MV Tampa ship carrying asylum seekers 
to enter Australian waters). The Coalition subsequently increased its majority and 
registered the biggest swing to an incumbent government since 1966. The 2004 
election pitted Howard against the erratic Mark Latham, with Howard’s leadership 
and economic management proving decisive in his fourth election victory. 
Securing control of the Senate was an added bonus that year. 
 
With a longer electoral cycle, Blair’s huge victory in 1997 gave him the platform 
to win again in 2001. Only in 2005 did his unpopularity begin to bite, with his 
majority cut by 100 seats to 66. In common with Howard, Blair faced a weak 
opposition with a succession of leaders throughout his premiership. Yet in both 
countries the opposition re-established itself. Renewal through a change of 
leader initially helped Blair’s successor Gordon Brown, but Howard was undone 
seeking a fifth term. He had misread the mood of the country and his leadership, 
previously his strongest card, became his weakness when confronted by a new 
opponent. Kevin Rudd shifted the ALP towards Howard’s territory, describing 
himself as an economic conservative and campaigning on the need for new 
leadership. 
 
Blair and Howard both headed parties that are be considered ‘catch all’ parties, 
whereby ideology is dampened to broaden appeal. Furthermore, both the British 
Labour party and Australian Liberal party are pragmatic parties, interested in 
adopting policies that will bring them to power and maintain them in power. The 
evolution of the parties has seen the Liberal party conform to Panebianco’s 
classification as an electoral-professional party, eclipsing the rival ALP’s slow 
movement in this direction.40 The appeal, based on a continuous and 
coordinated market research strategy and projection of image of the party leader 
in the media, saw the British Labour party evolve under Blair’s leadership, while 
the British Conservative party played catch up. 
 
Paul Kelly, writing specifically on Australian parties, goes as far as to state that 
without executive power the major parties not only look weak, but ‘unviable’.41 
Parties need electoral success, and the problems suffered by the Liberals 
between 1983 and 1996 and the ALP since 1996, illustrate this vividly. The 
Australian Liberal party is particularly dependent on being in office and 
consequently gives the leader much autonomy. The parliamentary party has the 
power to choose and remove leaders, but beyond that authority is vested in the 
leader, until he fails or looks likely to. It helps that the legislature is small with 
only 150 House of Representative members and 76 in the Senate. The 
parliamentary party in Howard’s final term was therefore made up of 74 members 
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 from the lower house and 33 senators, constituting a ‘party room’ (the term used 
to describe the parliamentary party) of 107. Contrast this with the current number 
of Labour MPs in the British House of Commons (353 out of total legislature of 
646). Even for a party renowned for its discipline and party management, it is no 
surprise that Howard was able to run a much tighter ship than Blair. 
 
The Liberal party ‘places great importance on leadership; on the need for 
Parliament to lead the nation, on the need for Cabinet to lead the Parliament, on 
the need for its own leader to lead the party’.42 Dissent under Howard was rare 
(generally confined to the party room) and unity maintained. Treasurer and rival 
Costello had experienced and capable supporters who were not rewarded with 
ministerial positions (such as Petro Georgiou). Indeed when three members 
including Georgiou voted against the government in protest at measures to 
process asylum seekers offshore in August 2006 it was a unique event. It led 
Howard to withdraw the proposal in the Senate. Howard was a careful manager 
of his rivals; he gave room in cabinet for discussion, but denied potential 
challengers any power base. He engaged with the party room to keep the 
numbers in his favour at all times. He only pushed ahead with politically difficult 
issues when he could be certain of winning the political battle (as with the 
introduction of the GST). Indeed for Howard each day as prime minister was a 
mini political battle to be won. Having worked so hard to gain the position he was 
not prepared to give it up easily. 
 
Blair never felt the need to massage and consult with the party through the 
parliamentary mechanism. Former Cabinet Minister Robin Cook commented in 
his diaries in 2002 ‘The danger for Tony [Blair] is that the sole reason he has 
retained the affection and support of the party is because he has delivered 
phenomenal popularity for the party. The risk is that if he ever loses that 
popularity, there will be no other reason left for the party to give him their 
support’43. Blair came to power as the unchallenged Labour party leader. Party 
constraints on the leadership had been loosened prior to 1997. The drive to 
increase membership did not compromise the autonomy of the leadership, 
indeed it may have enhanced it. As Peter Mair has pointed out the activist level in 
the party, which is traditionally the more troublesome, becomes marginalised by 
the influx of ‘ordinary new members more likely to adopt the leadership’s 
position’44. The impact of Blair’s dominance of the party on a structural and 
personal level has been a largely compliant party. Yet over time as the 
parliamentary majorities fell from 179 in 1997 to 166 in 2001 and then 67 in 2005, 
so did Blair’s authority over the party. Intra-party power and authority enabled 
both Howard and Blair to build a platform to project a public profile that sustained 
them in the public eye and distanced them from political rivals and the political 
party in general. 
 
 
4. Prime Minister as Autonomous Agent 
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 Leadership is relational, a process of interaction with followers. Without 
supporters, followers, and indeed voters, a leader’s tenure will not survive. 
Dependency and interaction may be important but, as Poguntke and Webb 
suggest, so too is autonomy for the leader. If this is the case the leader’s power 
(in majoritarian systems) is contingent on tolerance of the party. Parties will tend 
to tolerant as long as the leader appears an electoral asset. 
 
Being an electoral asset means reaching out as an individual with a defined 
public profile. During election campaigns this relates to an increased focus on the 
leader at the expense of the general profile of the party agenda. Ian McAllister, 
after analysing Australian public opinion poll data from 1973 to 2003, concluded 
that 
 
 The results emphasise the extent to which the leader has absorbed the 
 functions once exercised by the party, a pattern now familiar across other 
 advanced democracies’.45 
 
Public opinion here acts as a useful barometer over time. Although a rather blunt 
instrument, the graph below plots the two leaders’ popularity fluctuations over the 
past ten years. The graph demonstrates the unprecedented high Blair maintained 
in office in his early years, while Howard struggled to convince the public early 
on. The dip for Blair in September 2000 relates to the fuel protests, which 
paralysed the country and represented Blair’s first real test in government. 
Howard’s dip in 2001 was the result of a series of electoral losses, the effects of 
introduction of the GST, and then later in that year the ‘children overboard affair’. 
Both leaders saw a surge in popularity following the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the US. Blair’s ratings fell away again dramatically after this date, only 
bouncing back once troops were committed to Iraq in 2003. Howard also gets a 
‘support the troops’ bounce, but settled into a more consistently positive level of 
approval. The poll data shows the impact (both positive and negative) of the 
same external shocks and demonstrates the relatively stable positive ratings of 
Howard compared to the downward trend of Blair over the same period of time. 
However almost inevitably Howard’s ratings in common with Blair fell after June 
2006 right up to the election in November 2007, seemingly out of step with 
Australian public opinion on climate change, industrial relations, indigenous 
affairs, and Iraq.  
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Leaders matter, not only in election campaigns, but at other times. The leader is 
held responsible for policy decisions, presents them and justifies them. Leaders 
are the public face of the government and as such gain from government 
successes, but suffer when government fails. Michael Foley describes this 
propulsion of leaders into the public arena and away from government as ‘spatial 
leadership’ and asserts that the possession of a public identity is a political 
resource in its own right.46 Whilst the development of a strong public profile for 
prime ministers is not new (Thatcher for instance was assiduous in cultivating a 
relationship with voters that went beyond that of the party leader, and Hawke was 
a ground-breaking example of a prime minister with the ‘personal touch’), it has 
been taken to a new level in recent years. The greater the public identity: the 
more powerful the political resource. The contemporary context is well described 
by Heffernan: ‘An interest in political celebrity, backed by an ever more prevalent 
interest in process journalism, magnifies the modern prime minister, placing him 
or her centre stage in key political processes’.47 
 
Electoral analysis has generally downplayed the influence of party leaders in 
British elections. Contrary to the perceived wisdom in the media, and amongst 
politicians themselves, Tony King contested that ‘the personality of leaders and 
candidates mattered a lot less and a lot less often, in elections than is usually 
supposed’.48 Yet political scientists have not been deterred in looking for 
leadership effects. After considering the experiences of thirteen country case 
studies Poguntke and Webb concluded that ‘leader-centred election campaigning 
and media coverage have generally been both increasing, or starting from 
comparatively high levels in most cases’49. Furthermore they suggest that leader 
effects on voters do appear to be significant and increasing, as in an age of 
competitive elections voters are now less constrained by stable party loyalties 
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 and are freer to base their voting on the personal and political qualities of 
leaders. Earlier quantitative work, using British Election Survey data argued that 
leadership evaluations remained highly significant even after other variables 
(including party identification), have been taken into account.50 In Australia, 
studies based on survey data collected in the 1970s and 1980s concluded that 
leaders do indeed have independent effects on the vote above and beyond what 
voters feel about the parties.51 Though leadership effects can be both positive 
and negative, they are strongest when leaders are conceptualised as 
autonomous electoral forces. In an era of ‘valence politics’ where there is a broad 
agreement on the end to be pursued (lower crime and corruption, more peace 
and prosperity), leaders are the unique point on which voters will choose.  
 
With Australia’s shorter electoral cycle (three years), the ability to maintain the 
‘permanent campaign’ whilst in office and exploit the benefits of incumbency is 
crucial. Howard’s discipline and attention to detail made him well placed to 
exploit such a political environment. It was the perception of Howard’s 
determination and strength that allowed him to score relatively high popular 
approval ratings despite seeming to pursue unpopular policies. This approval 
rating was facilitated by weak voter attachment, enhancing the role of the leader 
who can now ‘stand in’ for parties, representing issues, integrating interests and 
mobilising opinion. Bean and McAllister, in their assessment of the 2004 federal 
election, concluded that popular perceptions of party leaders were much more 
important than socio-economic issues in the campaign. The high personal 
popularity of John Howard therefore counted for a great deal. Bean and 
McAllister suggest that the effects of the Iraq war were mediated by voters’ 
evaluations of Howard. So his autonomous position, personally associating 
himself with the policy blunted its negative effects.52 
 
Blair too, swiftly developed this deliberate relationship with the electorate, albeit 
over a longer electoral cycle. In both the 1997 and 2001 election campaigns the 
leader was central to the message that party strategists were seeking to convey 
to the electorate. Blair proved particularly adept at utilising this shift towards 
television-based, personality-centred campaigning, and exemplified the move 
from the partified to the presidential in terms of style. This autonomy can prove to 
have negative effects too. By making the Iraq war such a personal matter for 
Blair, he suffered as the above graph demonstrates. He had approached the war 
with a personal zeal, convinced that he was right, personalising the decision and 
limiting his advice structures to small groups of confidents. He went on the front 
foot personally to persuade the public and Labour party in the face of 
considerable opposition – whilst he won parliamentary support only with the 
opposition votes his authority was dented. 
 
Howard developed a personal dialogue with the public, not by preaching or 
hectoring, but by identifying himself with ‘ordinary’ Australians. He regularly 
appeared on radio talk shows, his morning power walk became a national symbol 
of his leadership, and he would muse on anything Australian from swimmer Ian 
Thorpe’s retirement to the price of bananas. Yet, Howard had by the end of his 
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 premiership become isolated, cabinet rivals openly plotted against him conscious 
that he had become a liability as leader. The distance he had placed between 
himself and his political rivals came back to haunt him. Cabinet, his source of 
strength, was even sidelined (most notably on an A$10bn water plan for the 
Murray-Darling basin). 
 
These leadership effects rely on communication to project and promote the prime 
minister. The modern prime minister can use ‘his resources of public 
communication – his media management offices, his media access and his 
public reputation - to turn authority into power, over events, people and 
policies’.53 Both Howard and Blair developed a shrewd understanding of how the 
media can work in their favour. Institutionalised media management capacity was 
not as extensive and pervasive under Howard although the media unit in the 
Prime Minister’s Office was ‘the largest ever assembled by an Australian prime 
minister’.54 Blair and Howard operated in different media climates. For Blair the 
relationship with the key print media titles (and their proprietors) was crucial, for 
Howard his relationship with talkback radio grew to define his media strategy in 
reaching beyond the Canberra press gallery.55 It allowed him to ‘address an 
older, more conservative audience which he regards as his natural constituency’ 
and circumvent the specialist political journalists to speak directly to voters.56 
 
Blair showed a similar desire to reach out directly to voters without the message 
being channelled by the main, Westminster-based, print or broadcast media. This 
autonomous relationship had a two-fold aim; to strengthen the prime minister’s 
authority over his or her colleagues by an enhanced public profile and to set the 
government’s agenda. As Heffernan notes, ‘political communications offer an 
already strong prime minister an additional means of expanding intra-
governmental power this has been a particular feature of the Blair premiership, 
the circumvention of collegial constraints in parliamentary government’. The 
media is used in a coordinated fashion to trail policy, ‘interpret’ speeches and 
announcements, and as an informal conduit. 
 
Howard by contrast ran a tight ship and although considerable use of media 
advisers was made, the level of briefing, leaking and media management was 
small in comparison. The shorter electoral cycle in Australia, puts a greater 
imperative on constant news management. Senior Australian journalist Michelle 
Grattan has acknowledged Howard as ‘an extraordinarily activist and canny 
media operator, always out there, visible, with something to say, in forums of his 
choosing, on everything’, but she lamented the way ‘a modern government 
operates like a powerful hose, designed to get the message out in a forceful, 
directed and managed way’ and described the Howard method as ‘intimidation 
and favouritism’.57  
 
Public projection for the leader therefore points two ways, establishing the 
machinery and channelling ‘the message’ through the formalised media on the 
one hand and reaching out above and beyond the traditional outlets on the other 
hand. Both of these approaches emanate from the centre and can be identified in 
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 the Blair and Howard premierships. These are essentially institutionalised 
features of prime ministerial power, however it is the personal ability to utilise 
these resources that may (but may not) give prime ministers critical 
predominance. Even so not matter how well a prime minister marshals news 
media resources, if they are unpopular and weak they will remain so. And as the 
experience of Blair and Howard has shown, once personal political becomes 
diminished it is hard to recover. 
 
Conclusion: Excessive Leadership? 
 
The prevailing view of the core executive in Westminster systems emphasises 
interdependent networks at the core of the executive58. Such analysis sees 
leaders not as unfettered, but constrained by new informal mechanisms and 
accountable in a system of governance, whereby power is relational and 
diffused. Indeed in a ‘hollowed out state’ prime ministers may have less power as 
decision making is located elsewhere. Blair was often portrayed as frustrated by 
his inability to progress the New Labour agenda domestically, while he could 
assert his will in foreign affairs. However constrained he may have been 
domestically; his autonomous actions in foreign affairs (on Iraq in particular) 
eroded both his public standing and support within the Labour party. 
 
The power of a prime minister may indeed be locational and relational depending 
on others and the structural resources; but power and authority is now 
increasingly found in the agency rather than the institution of the prime minister. 
The trend identified by Webb, McAllister and others is for a greater centralisation 
of institutional power, particularly as much decision making is located elsewhere 
(sub-national level, international level, non-governmental). McAllister believes 
that the change or trend is gradual and in some cases outweighed by the 
personalities involved.59 Blair bolstered policy capacity at the centre (units across 
Downing Street and the Cabinet Office and an emphasis on delivery), while 
Howard strengthened cabinet structures (the Cabinet Policy Unit and Cabinet 
Implementation Unit). Both leaders increased external, contestable (and often 
politicised) advice - largely through greater numbers of ministerial advisers. So 
the personality of the leader is a strong determinant. 
 
Three factors drive the collection of personal prime ministerial resources in the 
two cases; strength of character, control of (and autonomy from) the party, and 
public projection. Within these three drivers there are overlapping contextual 
themes: interaction, events and techniques. Strong leaders are not dictators and 
interaction with colleagues, followers and the public is the key to gaining authority 
and trust. Events have shaped these two leaders in the way they have committed 
themselves to the security agenda post September 11, and their involvement in 
military action in various arenas. Techniques of leadership are now well 
established and essential for modern successful election campaigns and media 
strategies to derive the full benefits of incumbency. In sum, 
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 - Blair and Howard demonstrated ‘strong leadership’, encompassing a 
tough, moralistic, uncompromising stance. 
- Both leaders became autonomous agents, reaching beyond the executive, 
party and engaging directly with the electorate. 
- Personality, control, and public projection combine to establish leaders as 
predominant forces in the extra-executive environment. 
- Though agency (and the power to influence) is important, prime ministerial 
power is still contingent on location, relation, environment and events.  
 
In Britain the Blair style of government led to criticism from a range of sources 
and greater institutional constraints enveloped the prime minister in his third 
term. Some core elements of the command and control nature of the premiership 
were questioned. Communications strategy after the Alistair Campbell era came 
under scrutiny (Phillis Report 2003), while prime ministerial patronage and party 
funding also came into the spotlight (Phillips Report 2007). In Australia Howard 
too finally exhausted his political capital, being removed not only from power in 
November 2007, but also losing his parliamentary seat. He left a Coalition heavily 
defeated and out of office at both federal and state level. His governing style had 
enhanced the already considerable power of the executive (particularly as control 
of the senate after 2004 enabled him to force through unpopular legislation in 
areas such as industrial relations) and the emphasis on his personal leadership 
had hollowed out the Liberal party, leaving it in a state of disarray. In both cases 
many of the institutional changes at the centre that enhanced prime ministerial 
predominance will survive. Gordon Brown adopted the policy and strategy 
capacity developed under Blair and Kevin Rudd has shown only limited signs of 
dismantling the politicised nature of the advisory structures entrenched under 
Howard. Recognition, though, of the limits of prime ministerial domination which 
surfaced swiftly after Blair’s premiership (particularly with regard to the prime 
minister’s war powers) have not been reflected in Australia to the same extent.60 
 
Yet beyond the institutional, leaders clearly still matter, and as Paul Kelly said in 
relation to Howard ‘modest leaders can become giant killers’. In monarchical 
constitutions such as Britain and Australia, where the monarch plays a role as 
figurehead only, the leadership of the country is embodied by the prime minister, 
and the currency placed on these leaders in a mediatised world has increased as 
institutions such as parties have declined. Walter and Strangio note that as 
greater expectations are invested in leaders, more extensive responsibilities are 
delegated to them by parties and the public and they consequently act as 
‘superheroes’.  
 
The ‘Strong Leader’ thesis needs revisiting, particularly the strong leader’s 
‘intention to overcome and marginalise contrary views‘. Howard and Blair 
certainly conformed to this predominant view of prime ministers, though 
ultimately they fell dramatically from office the trend of leader-centric politics 
shows little sign of diminishing.  
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